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APPLICATIONS OF ELLIPTIC CURVE PAIRINGS IN
CRYPTOGRAPHY
COLIN BOYD
Abstract. Elliptic curve pairings have seen an explosion of interest in
the cryptographic research community in the last few years. Unlike most
earlier public key cryptosystems, pairing-based cryptosystems cannot be
properly understood or implemented without advanced mathematical un-
derstanding. This paper aims to explain the reasons that pairings are so
important in cryptography and to introduce some of the relevant mathe-
matical problems in the area.
1. Introduction
Public key cryptography first became known in the 1970s. The first pro-
posed public key cryptosystems were based on integer factorisation, knapsacks
and discrete logarithm problems. While knapsack-based systems were the sub-
ject of successful cryptanalysis which has effectively discontinued their use [16],
factorisation-based systems such as RSA [18] and discrete logarithm systems
such as Diffie-Hellman [7] have survived and are widely deployed in commercial
and open source security products.
A characteristic of the first public key cryptosystems is that their algo-
rithms are easily understood by anyone with a good knowledge of high school
mathematics. Although security analysis has typically used more sophisti-
cated techniques, such as lattice theory and integer factorisation methods, all
that is needed to understand how the RSA cryptosystem and Diffie-Hellman
key exchange work is modular arithmetic and Euler’s theorem.
In the mid-1980s elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was first proposed [12,
14]. Over several years ECC has won the confidence of the security community
and it is now widely used in products and supported by various industry
standards. This has made it harder for people without a mathematical training
to appreciate exactly how the security mechanisms work that they rely on for
securing their communications. Yet ECC can be seen as identical to earlier
discrete logarithm-based cryptographic algorithms simply moved to a different
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2algebraic setting. As long as the algebraic notion of a group is understood,
elliptic curve arithmetic is not hard to grasp either by following the simple
addition definition or by analogy with the chord-and-tangent geometry that
applies over the real numbers.
Recall that an elliptic curve is defined by a cubic polynomial over some
field. In cryptography we always use a finite field Fq, where q is a power of
a prime p, since we need to deal with a discrete message space. For fields
of characteristic greater than 3 an elliptic curve can always be defined by an
equation of the form y2 = x3 + ax + b with a and b elements in Fq. The group
law defines addition of points (x, y) satisfying the equation plus the special
“point at infinity” which is the identity element in the group. We will write
E(Fq) to denote an elliptic curve group defined over Fq.
Elliptic curve pairings were first used in cryptography in the 1990s but at
that time they were applied only as a cryptanalysis tool. A revolution started
in 2000 when it was first realised that pairings can be used in the construction
of public key cryptosystems. In contrast to the reasons for using elliptic curve
groups in existing discrete logarithm-based cryptosystems, the huge interest
in elliptic curve pairings is not primarily connected to more efficient imple-
mentation of public key cryptography. Instead, pairings allow new algebraic
properties to be used in cryptography, particularly due to their bilinearity.
Pairings have been used to design cryptographic schemes that cannot be sat-
isfactorily implemented in any other known way; they were pivotal in solving
the long-standing open problem of how to realize identity-based cryptography.
Pairing-based cryptography requires sophisticated mathematics. Even to
understand how to implement a pairing-based cryptosystem requires advanced
understanding of algebraic structures. Since it is still an emerging field there
are many fundamental problems still open. This presents an opportunity for
mathematicians to work closely with cryptologists to achieve results which
cannot be attained by either group alone. The purpose of this paper is to
explain the importance of pairing-based cryptography and to point out some
areas where mathematicians can contribute to research. We consider the fol-
lowing questions:
• Why are pairings useful in cryptography?
• What are some of the different applications that have emerged?
• What are the main properties required of pairings in cryptography?
2. Elliptic Curves and Pairings
Elliptic curves have been applied in cryptography for over 20 years. The
original motivation for their use was to save on computation and bandwidth.
Elliptic curves can be used to design public key cryptosystems based on dis-
crete logarithm assumptions which can typically be implemented in any group.
3Definition 1. Let G be a multiplicative group and g ∈ G be a point with order
r. Let x be chosen randomly in Zr. The discrete logarithm problem with
respect to G, g is to find x given gx as input.
The discrete logarithm problem in the multiplicative group of a finite field
was the basis of some of the earliest public key cryptosystems. For imple-
mentation efficiency fields of characteristic 2 or 3 were initially believed to be
useful, but it was soon discovered that these groups admit a more efficient
algorithm for computing discrete logarithms than fields of higher character-
istic. A multiplicative subgroup of a field of prime order has been a popular
choice for cryptosystems based on the difficulty of discrete logarithms. Even
here there are sub-exponential time algorithms for finding discrete logarithms,
such as the number field sieve. Consequently a field of size 1024 bits is cur-
rently viewed as the minimum size acceptable, while much larger sizes are
required for high security.
The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is simply the dis-
crete logarithm problem in an elliptic curve group. Since we conventionally
write elliptic curve groups with additive notation the ECDLP problem be-
comes the problem to find x given xP , where P generates a large subgroup of
an elliptic curve group. The computational advantage of elliptic curve cryp-
tography stems from the lack of any known sub-exponential time algorithm
to solve the ECDLP. Instead the best known algorithms have running time
proportional to the square root of the group order. Therefore elliptic curves
groups of order around 160 bits are currently regarded as secure. Not only
are the cryptographic keys for elliptic curve cryptography much shorter than
those defined in finite fields, but the computational cost is smaller as well.
A non-trivial problem in using elliptic curve groups in cryptography is to
find the order of a randomly generated curve. Although feasible methods exist
today, it was a difficult problem in the early days of elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy. For this reason it was sometimes suggested to use the special class of
supersingular curves, for which the number of points are easily determined (in
fact the order can essentially be chosen in advance).
Definition 2. An elliptic curve is supersingular if #E(Fq) ≡ 1 mod p where
q is a power of p. A curve that is not supersingular is called ordinary.
2.1. Elliptic curve pairings. We first consider an abstract view of pairings.
Consider a triple of groups G1, G2 (both additive), GT (multiplicative), all of
prime order l. Here GT is known as the target group. A pairing e is a mapping
e : G1 ×G2 → GT
which is bilinear. Thus for P, Q ∈ G1 and R, S ∈ G2:
• e(P + Q, R) = e(P, R) · e(Q, R)
4• e(P, R + S) = e(P, R) · e(P, S)
In order for our pairings to be practically useful we impose two additional
requirements.
Non-degeneracy: e(P, R) 6= 1 for some P ∈ G1, R ∈ G2.
Computability: e(P, R) can be efficiently computed.
A consequence of bilinearity is that
e(aP, bR) = e(abP, R) = e(P, R)ab = e(bP, aR) = . . .
Bilinearity is the critical property that makes pairings useful for cryptography.
Note, however, that the bilinearity alone is only useful in combination with a
hard computational problem. There are a number of possible problems that
could be used, but the most fundamental one seems to be the bilinear version
of the well-established Diffie-Hellman problem. In any multiplicative group the
Diffie-Hellman problem is to compute gab from the values ga and gb. Note that
the Diffie-Hellman problem is no harder than the discrete logarithm problem
since if a can be computed from ga then gab = (gb)a can be computed too.
Definition 3 (BDH problem). Suppose e : G1 × G2 → GT is a pairing as
above. Given P, aP, bP ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2 for a, b ∈ Z
∗
p, the Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (BDH) problem is to compute e(P, Q)ab.
The BDH assumption says that there is no efficient algorithm to solve the
BDH problem with non-negligible probability (as a function of some security
parameter that controls the instance size). As with most problems on which
public key cryptographic algorithms are based, we do not know the precise
difficulty of solving the BDH problem. What is easy to see is that the BDH
problem is no harder than the Diffie-Hellman problem in either GT or G1.
For example, suppose that we have an algorithm A that can solve the Diffie-
Hellman problem in GT (a multiplicative group). Then given P, aP, bP ∈ G1
and Q ∈ G2 we can give e(aP, Q) = e(P, Q)
a and e(bP, Q) = e(P, Q)b as inputs
to A which then outputs the Diffie-Hellman value e(P, Q)ab which is also the
BDH solution.
The BDH problem can be generalised by allowing the points P and Q
to lie in either of the two groups G1, G2. All options are possible, though
some choices may be more appropriate than others as discussed by Smart and
Vercauteren [21]. It can sometimes be arranged that G1 = G2; then we can
write Q = cP and the BDH problem is to compute e(P, P )abc.
2.2. Pairings from Elliptic Curves. Pairings on elliptic curves have been
known for a long time. Typically, G1, G2 are subgroups of the group of l-




the least integer with l|qk − 1. The value k is called the embedding degree of
5the pairing and is a very important parameter in balancing the security level
and computational efficiency of pairing-based cryptosystems. Typical choices
for the pairing are the Weil and Tate pairings (the latter being more efficient).
More details on constructions of pairings may be found in the chapter of
Galbraith [9].
In general, elliptic curve pairings suitable for cryptographic applications
are mappings e : G1 × G2 → GT where G1 and G2 are subgroups of an
elliptic curve group (over possibly different finite fields) and GT is a subgroup
of some finite field. All three of these groups are usually chosen to be of
prime order l. There are numerous different choices for the elliptic curves and
for the details of the mapping. Galbraith et al. [10] divide the options into
three types according to whether homomorphisms exist between G1 and G2 in
both directions, in one direction (from G2 to G1) or in neither direction. The
original implementation suggested for identity-based encryption [2] used only
the first type of pairing, but it has been realised since that there are many
potential benefits in allowing other types. Galbraith et al. point out that the
type of pairing can affect the parameter size, the efficiency of computation,
and the existence of a rigorous security proof. They also remark that pairings
which are optimal in every property do not exist. How best to balance such
properties for different applications remains an important research question.
2.3. Pairing-Friendly Curves. There are a number of different parameters
that arise in the generation of elliptic curves suitable for implementation of a
pairing-based cryptosystem. As usual in cryptography there is a balance to be
made between security and efficiency. Generally for security we need to make
parameters large enough so that the underlying computational problems are
hard, while for efficiency we need to make parameters as small as possible.
Typically we need to ensure that the order l of G1 is large enough that
the ECDLP is hard in G1. The length of l should be as close to length of
p as possible (ideally the same) which can be measured by the value ρ =
log(l)/ log(p) ≤ 1. In addition the embedding degree k must be large enough
that DLP in Fqk is hard. A small increase in k can have a large impact on
efficiency. It is still unknown how to optimise ρ for all values of k. A curve
for which a suitable collection 〈k, ρ, G1, G2, GT 〉 exists is said to be pairing-
friendly. Freeman, Scott and Teske [8] have produced a comprehensive study
of the currently known pairing friendly curves with k ≤ 50.
2.4. Pairings on Supersingular Curves. In many early designs for pairing-
based cryptosystems the usual choice of pairing was the modified Weil pairing
on supersingular curves. It was later realised that the Tate pairing is a more
efficient pairing to be used. The pairing needs to be modified using a so-
called distortion map to ensure that it is not degenerate. For supersingular
6curves we can have G1 = G2 which simplifies the presentation of schemes and
the security analyses. Moreover it allows “small” representations of group
elements in both G1 and G2.
However, a significant limitation of this setting for pairings is that the
embedding degree is limited to k ≤ 6. For characteristic bigger than 3 we
have k ≤ 3. These restrictions present a dilemma when working at higher
security levels due to the different rate at which the size of the elliptic curve
group must increase compared with the size with which the finite field must
increase. For example, to achieve a security level of 80 bits, we need to choose
l ≈ 160 since there is a square root attack to solve the discrete logarithm
problem in G1. This works well with k = 6 since the best discrete logarithm
algorithms in Zq∗ are estimated to require around 2
80 computations when
log2 q ≈ 960. However, for a security level of 128 bits we should choose
l ≈ 256 and log2 q ≈ 3072 which implies a value of k ≈ 12. This value of k is
impossible, so the best we can do on supersingular curves is to choose k = 6
and l ≈ 512 which results in G1 being twice as large as we really want.
2.5. Pairings on Ordinary Curves. If E is an ordinary curve, then a va-
riety of constructions for pairing-friendly curves are known. Using ordinary
curves removes the constraint on the possible values of k that occurs with su-
persingular curves. There are a number of constructions that allow ordinary
curves with low k values. The first such construction was due to Miyaji et al.
[15] and curves constructed with their method are known as MNT curves.
Unlike the supersingular case, we can no longer choose G1 = G2. Typically
G1 ⊂ E(Fq)[r] and G2 ⊂ E(Fqk)[r]. While non-supersingular curves allow
more options for k, there are certain trade-offs involved. Because G2 lies inside
a larger curve only elements of G1 may have short representations. Moreover
it may be difficult to hash onto G2. Page et al. [17] investigated the relative
benefits of supersingular and ordinary curves as the basis of pairing-based
cryptography.
2.6. A Concrete Example. Let E(Fp) be the supersingular curve defined
by y2 = x3 + 1 defined over the prime field Fp with p ≡ 2 mod 3. E(Fp) has
p + 1 points. Suppose l is a large prime with l|p + 1. Then G is the group of
points of order l in E(Fp) and there is a pairing e : G×G → GT . Since p + 1
divides p2 − 1 the embedding degree is k = 2. GT is the group of l-th order
roots of unity in Fp2 .
2.7. MOV Attack. The first application of pairings in cryptography was
not a new cryptosystem but a way of attacking elliptic curve cryptography
when implemented on supersingular curves. In 1993 Menezes, Okamoto and
Vanstone [13] noticed that the Weil pairing can be used to transfer the discrete
logarithm problem from elliptic curves to finite fields.
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ECDLP is to find α with R = αP . Choose Q ∈ G2 so that g = e(P, Q) 6= 1.
Then g is a generator of GT . Moreover, e(R, Q) = e(αP, Q) = e(P, Q)
α =
gα. Therefore if we can solve the discrete logarithm problem in GT we can
also solve it in G1. If the embedding degree k is small then solving discrete
logarithms in GT can be easy. Hence supersingular curves are usually avoided
for (ordinary, not pairing-based) elliptic curve cryptography.
3. Pairings and Key Agreement
Two of the earliest applications of pairings in cryptography concern key
agreement. This is the problem of how a set of two or more users can agree
a secret unknown to other users. The first key agreement protocol was due
to Diffie and Hellman [7] and it remains the basis for the majority of key
agreement protocols in use today. Users A and B exchange one message each
in such a way that both can compute a secret which is unknown to observers.
In its original setting the Diffie–Hellman protocol makes use of public pa-
rameters p and g where p is a large prime and g is a generator of Z∗p. User A
chooses a random private key a ∈ {0, ..., p− 1} and B chooses a similar key b.
User A sends to B the value ga and B sends to A the value gb. Both A and B
can compute the shared key gab = (ga)b = (gb)a. As already mentioned, the
problem of finding gab from the exchanged values ga and gb is known as the
Diffie-Hellman problem.
It is not hard to see that the Diffie-Hellman protocol can be defined in any
group. In particular, suppose P is a generator of a subgroup of E(Fp) of prime
order r. A chooses a random private key a ∈ {0, ..., r − 1} and B chooses a
similar key b. A sends aP to B and B sends bP to A. Then both A and B
can both compute the shared key abP = b(aP ) = a(bP ).
In the basic Diffie-Hellman protocol there is no authentication of the par-
ties. This means that an active adversary can masquerade as any user. The
usual solution is to add public key certificates. To form a certificate a trusted
authority provides a digital signature linking A with her public key aP . Cer-
tificates and public keys can be provided in a public directory - this allows
non-interactive key agreement.
(1) Alice looks up Bob’s public key bP and verifies the certificate stored
with it.
(2) Alice can then compute abP which she knows is a shared secret. No
interaction with B is required.
83.1. Identity-based Cryptography. While public key cryptography removes
the need to distribute secret keying material, the necessity to ensure the in-
tegrity and authenticity of public keys remains. Digital certificates are a gen-
eral solution to the problem of authenticating public keys. However, man-
agement of digital certificates (often referred to as public key infrastructure)
has proven to be a significant practical problem. As early as 1984, Shamir
[20] proposed the idea of identity-based cryptography to simplify public key
management. Users do not have certificates at all and the public key becomes
the identity of the owner of the private key.
In conventional public key cryptography, public key values are essentially
random strings derived from previously chosen private keys. In identity-based
cryptography the public key (identity string) is chosen first which allows any
string to be used as a public key. Although this adds considerable flexibility it
does mean that private keys must be generated by a trusted authority instead
of being chosen by users. It is also worth mentioning that system parameters
are always required, which in some systems can be quite lengthy.
Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara [19] seem to be the first to have noticed that
pairings can be useful for identity-based cryptography. Their basic idea for
constructing identity-based keys from pairings has also been used in many
later schemes.
• Assume we have a pairing e : G × G → GT and a hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → G.
• The Trusted Authority (TA) selects as its master secret a value s ∈ Zl.
• Entity A’s public key is defined to be H(IDA).
• Entity A with identity IDA receives private key sH(IDA) from the TA.
Sakai et al. first applied their idea to achieve non-interactive key exchange.
Although this scheme has much in common with the non-interactive Diffie-
Hellman protocol mentioned above, it has the considerable advantage that no
certificates are required. Thus, once the identity of a chosen peer is known, a
shared secret with that peer can be instantly computed.
A and B can compute a shared key e(H(IDA), H(IDB))
s as follows.
• A computes e(sH(IDA), H(IDB))
• B computes e(H(IDA), sH(IDB))
Security of this key agreement protocol depends on the BDH assumption.
More precisely an adversary who can gain an advantage in distinguishing the
key of any two participants can gain an advantage in solving the BDH problem.
A version exists in the more general setting e : G1 ×G2 → GT .
The SOK identity-based key exchange protocol has been used as a building
block in several other applications. These include authenticated dynamic key
exchange protocols and secret handshake protocols [1].
93.2. Tripartite Diffie-Hellman. As mentioned earlier, the Diffie-Hellman
protocol has been a very influential primitive in the design of all kinds of secu-
rity protocols. One natural direction of enquiry is whether the Diffie-Hellman
protocol can be generalised to multiple parties while maintaining its attrac-
tive properties. One such property is its ability to be run in one round which
means that all protocol messages can be sent and received simultaneously. A
one round protocol can be very efficient in time taken to complete. Joux [11]
showed that pairings can be used to design a 3-party one round key agreement
protocol which can be seen as an analogue of Diffie-Hellman.
Fix generator P ∈ G. Parties A, B and C respectively choose random
a, b, c ∈ Zl.
• A sends aP to B and C.
• B sends bP to A and C.
• C sends cP to B and A.
All parties can compute the shared secret
e(P, P )abc = e(bP, cP )a = e(aP, cP )b = e(aP, bP )c.
Notice that all messages can be sent simultaneously so this protocol can be
completed in one round.
Security of Joux’s protocol against a passive adversary is based on the
BDH assumption. Like plain Diffie-Hellman key agreement, Joux’s protocol
is insecure against active adversaries due to lack of authentication. This can
be remedied by adding signatures or other authentication methods. Joux’s
protocol can be generalised to more parties if a multi-linear map can be found
satisfying an appropriate multilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption as shown by
Boneh and Silverberg [3].
4. ID-based Encryption (IBE)
Identity-based signatures were developed by Shamir in his 1984 paper, while
other identity-based primitives, such as key agreement, were also designed
during the 1980s. However, a practical design for identity-based encryption
remained an open problem until 2001. Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara [19] used
pairings to construct the first efficient and secure identity-based encryption
scheme. Boneh and Franklin [2] proposed essentially the same scheme and
provided a full proof of security.
Setup: We require a pairing e : G × G → GT and two hash functions H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → G, H2 : GT → {0, 1}
n, where n is the length of plaintexts.
(1) Choose an arbitrary generator P ∈ G.
(2) Select a master-key s uniformly at random from Z∗l and set P0 = sP .
(3) The public system parameters consist of the set: 〈G, GT , e, n, P, P0, H1, H2〉.
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Generate private key: Given a string ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ compute QID = H1(ID) and
set sQID as the private key.
Encrypt: Inputs are a message M and an identity ID. In step 3 the symbol ⊕
denotes addition modulo 2.
(1) Compute QID = H1(ID) ∈ G1.
(2) Choose random r ∈ Zq.
(3) Compute the ciphertext C = (rP, M ⊕H2(e(QID, P0)
r)).
Decrypt: Inputs are a ciphertext (U, V ) and a secret sQID.
Compute M = V ⊕H2(e(sQID, U)).
Security of Boneh-Franklin’s identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme is
based on the BDH assumption. To get an idea of how this works, notice that
both sender (who has r) and receiver (who has sQID) can compute e(QID, P )
rs:
e(QID, P )
rs = e(QID, P0)
r = e(sQID, rP )
However, computing e(QID, P )
rs from the values QID, rP and P0, which are
available to an adversary, is an instance of the BDH problem.
Naor (attributed by Boneh and Franklin) noticed that ID-based encryption
can also be used to construct digital signatures. The idea is to use the public
parameters of the IBE to form the public key of the signer. The signature
of a message m consists of the private key of the “identity” m. Signature
verification consists of checking that the private key is correct. For example,
the verifier can encrypt and decrypt a random message. Boneh, Lynn and
Shacham [5] optimised this idea to find digital signatures shorter than those
known before.
Setup: Generate the private key s and public key 〈G, GT , e, P, P0 = sP, H1〉.
Sign: To sign a message m, output σ = sH1(m) ∈ G.
Verify: Check e(H1(m), P0)
?
= e(σ, P ).
Note that P0, H1(m), σ form a Diffie-Hellman triple when σ is a valid sig-
nature. Verification checks this relationship. Security of signatures is based
on intractability of the Diffie-Hellman problem in G.
5. Pairing groups with composite order
The supersingular curve y2 = x3 +1 over the prime field Fp has p+1 points
if p ≡ 2 mod 3. Boneh, Goh and Nissim [4] proposed to generate a group with
a given square-free order n = q1q2 > 3 as follows.
(1) Fix n and select p as the smallest prime of the form p = Kn − 1 for
some K with p ≡ 2 mod 3.
(2) Let G be the subgroup of order n on the supersingular curve defined
above and GT be the subgroup of Fp2 of order n.
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(3) The modified Weil pairing e : G×G → GT is then well defined.
Boneh et al. used their construction to design cryptosystems with previ-
ously unavailable homomorphic properties. Their encryption function for a
(small) message m is C = mP + rQ where P generates G and Q generates the
subgroup of G of order q1. This encryption function is additively homomorphic
in G and also in GT while the pairing operation allows one multiplication op-
eration on encrypted data. Later Boneh and Waters [6] used this construction
to design broadcast encryption schemes.
It seems likely that there are other applications that can make use of the
trapdoor which is inherent in the use of pairing groups with composite order.
However, the construction above requires supersingular curves where the order
of the group can be essentially chosen. Freeman et al. [8] point out that the
only other known method is to use a generic construction (the Cocks–Pinch
method) which results in ρ ≈ 2. It would be useful to have more flexible
constructions.
6. Conclusion
This paper has aimed to give a feeling of the importance of elliptic curve
pairings in cryptography and, at the same time, to illustrate that there are
many problems that remain open. These include:
• deriving optimal choice of parameters satisfying various practical con-
straints;
• estimating the absolute difficulty of computational assumptions in-
volving pairings;
• designing more efficient algorithms for pairing computation.
This is a fast moving research area and there is an opportunity for math-
ematicians to work together with cryptographers and practitioners to make
significant progress.
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